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Abstract 
Minimum wages in Austria are bargaining results between labour unions and 
entrepreneurs. This paper analyses the empirical effects of minimum wages 
("Kollektivvertragslohne ") on employment. "Employment functions", based on a 
"neo-classical" partial analytic framework, are estimated. The empirical analysis that 
is done for aggregated Austrian industry and specific branches at first sight seems to 
support the standard theoretical thesis. In addition, problems caused by the used 
method, which may occur in similar studies too, are shown. They give rise to the 
possibility that models of this kind are misspecified. 
1. Introduction 
Problem 
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The central political argument for implementing minimum wages is the change of the 
income distribution. The poorest of the working people should be supported and 
therefore the wage differentials should decrease. 
The analysis concerning minimum wages may roughly be characterised as follows: 
First, most of the work is done for legal minimum wages. In this paper I interpret the 
bargaining result of unions and entrepreneurs as minimum wage too.l Second, most 
of the studies focus on the direct effects of minimum wages on employment.2 Effects 
on other economic indicators like output or productivity are analysed very seldom.3 
Third, most of the studies use comparative statics in a standard "neo-classical II partial-
analytic framework, which is based on comple.te competitive labour markets. 4 
Implementing minimum wages therefore means creating a factor market distortion that 
in this class of models has to cause negative effects on employment.5 Hence the 
according theoretical thesis is: Minimum wages decrease employment and, quite 
worse, specially those people who initially should be supported will loose their jobs. 6 
1 Most of the empirical literature about wage setting in a bargaining framework deals with effects of 
average wages. One of the few studies which analyses "bargained" minimum wages for instance is: 
BAZEN, MARTIN 1991. 
2 For the analysis of the effect on employment see for instance: EHRENBERG, MARCUS 1980 or 
BROWN 1988. 
3 Of course, this does not mean, that there were not a lot of different other questions discussed too. But 
this was not done so often. The effects on efficiency for example are discussed in: BROSNAN, 
WILKINSON 1988 or GUESNERIE, ROBERTS 1987. The effects on economic growth are for 
instance analysed in: MYAGIWA 1989. The effects on income distribution are discussed for example 
in: MEYER, WISE 1983 or GRAMLICH 1976. 
4 For instance see RAGAN 1981. 
5 Using a partial-analytic framework, the negative effect on employment even must not exist in the 
situation of a monopsony. In such a situation implementing minimum wages may increase the 
employment. This case is very seldom discussed. See: BROWN, GILROY, COHEN 1982. Positive 
effects were found by REBITZER, TAYLOR 1991 too who discussed the implementation of minimum 
wages in an efficiency wage model. 
In general equilibrium theory the argument of negative effects of minimum wages does not hold in 
every situation. Imagine you set the wage as numeraire. 
6 A good survey about different partial-analytic approaches to analyse the effect of implementing a 
minimum wage may be seen in: BROWN, GILROY, COHEN 1982. 
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Therefore there exists a big difference between the idea of smaller wage differentials 
and the theoretical results of the standard economic theory. The fourth point is about 
the empirical methods. Most of the studies use direct ordinary least squares (OLS) 
estimations.7 Methods of time series analysis are applied very seldom.8 
In opposition to the theoretical thesis mentioned above (minimum wages should 
decrease employment) there exist different arguments of the Austrian labour union 
which force the implementation of minimum wages. 9 One of these arguments states 
that minimum wages should give rise to a positive long term effect on productivity. If 
in fact this effect exists, I think it gives rise to the possibility that in the long run it 
can lead to output and even to employment increase. 
In Austria there exist minimum wages for most of the economic sectors, especially for 
manufacturing, which are the result of a bargaining process between the labour unions 
and entrepreneurs associations. In spite of the importance of minimum wages in 
Austria, no empirical studies about their employment effects in the industry arc done 
yet.10 
Before discussing the argument of the labour union, the proof of the traditional 
neoclassical argument seems to be interesting.11 Hence in this paper I ask for the 
following question: Which direct effects do minimum wages cause on Austrian 
industry's employment in a "neo-classical" framework? Therefore, following the 
traditional partial-analytic argument at first sight I would expect negative cff ects. 
Additionally I show problems concerning the estimation of this thesis. 
I carry out an analysis which is very similar to that of many studies done for the same 
subject for a lot of other countries and which, to some extend, is comparable with 
them. Hence I try to develop "employment functions" where, besides other variables, 
employment is a function of minimum wage. The estimated OLS equations arc on the 
7 A survey about empirical solutions may be seen for instance in: ECCLES, FREEMAN 1982 or 
BROWN, GILROY, COHEN 1982. 
8 Time series methods for analysing the effects of minimum wages are used in: RAGACS 1993. 
9 AUSTRIAN LABOUR UNION 1990, p. 16. 
10 For the effects of the aggregated average wages in the Austrian case see: THURY 1990. 
11 The discussion of the argument of the Jabour union is done in: RAGACS 1993. There I ask for the 
effects of minimum wages on employment, productivity and output in Austria. 
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one hand based on the idea of profit maximisation in a partial-analytic framework 
under perfect competition, and on the other hand on the idea of only partial 
adjustment towards the optimal amount of labour. 
Structure of the paper 
In section two I shortly describe facts of the Austrian minimum wages and the way 
they are implemented. In section three I execute a "traditional II regression analysis to 
measure the effects of minimum wages on employment growth of the industry as a 
whole and of special branches. First I describe the underlying bargaining model. 
Second I derive the estimated equations and after this I present the used data set, the 
estimation results and discuss some restrictions of this results. Part four sums up the 
central results. 
2. Minimum wages in Austria 
As mentioned above, minimum wages in Austria are the result of bargains between 
labour unions and entrepreneurs associations. Wage bargaining is dominated by a very 
strong central organisation of the union. Even though the bargains are done by 
decentral labour unions for the different branches, the central union organisation has 
to allow this bargains and there exists a strong relation between the central and the 
decentral organisations. Hence in the following for simplicity I speak about "the" 
labour union. 
The bargains are done in an informal framework without really legal foundation. Not 
only the labour union and the entrepreneurs are involved, but other important groups 
and (without vote) the government too. After the informal act to achieve a bargaining 
result, the state gives a legal approval by the court. Therefore the result of this 
contracts are supported by law. 
The bargaining takes place mostly every year or less and concerns a bundle of 
different contracts. Topics are working time, different working conditions and last but 
not least wages. In Austria such contracts exist for most parts of the private industry. 
The contracts are bargained for all workers and not only for the members of the 
unions. 
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A central official aim of the labour union was full employment, accordingly the 
macroeconomic situation very often had important influence on the results of the 
bargains. Hence in "bad times" the call for higher wages was less than in "good 
times". 
Central bargainings do exist about diff ercnt forms of wages. Most important arc the 
tariff wages ("Kollcktivvertragslohn "). They are different for all job categories and 
branches. The tariff wages describe the basic wage floor and hence, from an 
economic point of view, they are identical to legal minimum wages. Therefore on 
them I only focus my analysis. A second aim for the bargains is to set a minimum 
growth rate to all existing wages that are higher than the minimum wages ("lstlohn"). 
In addition to the two central wage bargains often there exist decentral wage bargains 
at the firm's level which lead to overpayment either of the minimum wage or of the 
"Istlohn". Hence the actual growth rates of many wages arc much higher than the 
results of the central bargaining would imply. 
Remarkable wage drifts between actually existing wages and tariff wages in one 
branch are to be found. Additionally even there exists a very central organisation of 
the Austrian labour union we find high inter-sectoral wage diff crenlials. 12 Even the 
minimum wages of the branches are different. 
Following figure shows the average wage floors (average minimum wages), the over 
all average wage and the wage differentials between over all average wages and 
average minimum wages for the aggregated Austrian industry: 
12 For instance see: HOFER 1992. 
Figure J: De,·elopment of hourly minimum wages, hourly average wages and 
their wage differentials for the Austrian industry, 1969-1991. 
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All wages are plotted in nominal Austrian Schillings (ATS). The nominal minimum 
wage rose from 13.39 ATS in 1969 to 79.11 ATS in 1991. The average wages 
changed in the same period from 18.20 to 98.08 ATS. The wage differential between 
minimum wages and average wages enlarged in the period from 28 percent in 1961 to 
40 percent in 1972. The following ten years it was bigger than 35 percent. After this 
time it was reduced to a value close to that of 1961, namely 27 percent in 1991.13 
3. Estimation of employment functions 
3.1. Bargaining model 
The first problem in discussing the effects of minimum wages is the description of the 
bargaining situation. I assume: UF is the utility of the firm, n describes profits, w the 
wage and N the employment. All firms have a utility function (from profit) in the 
13 0-.\·a alculations. 
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following form: UF = UF(1r(w ,N)). The concave utility function of the union (UG) is: 
ua = UG(w,N). In the following I assume that the solutions of the bargaining may 
be described by a (not necessarily) asymetric Nash solution. Threat point of the firm 
is a profit of zero (1r0). Threat point of the union is the reservation wage B. ci, with 
0 ~ tf> ~ 1 describes the bargaining power. 
In the literature we find three classes of models to describe the bargaining situation.14 
In "right to manage" models union and entrepreneur bargain about the wage and after 
it is fixed, firms unilaterally determine the employment. 15 N* describes the optimal 
employment given a bargained wage. When the following function is maximised, 
bargaining results are points on the traditional labour demand curve and wages are 
higher than in the complete competitive case if the bargaining power of the union is 
bigger than zero: 
max [(UF(~(w,N*(w))) - uF(~o)Jtf>. [(uG(w,N*(w)) - uG{B)j(l-tf>) 
w 
Monopoly models may be described as a special form of the "right to manage" 
models, where the bargaining power et> of the entrepreneur is zcro.16 
In models of "efficient bargainings" union and entrepreneur bargain about both, wage 
and employment.17 In the basic model solutions do not lie on the traditional lahour 
demand curve. The following function is maximised: 
max [UF(~(w,N))-UF(~o)Jtf>. [(uG(w,N) - uG(B)j(l-tf>) 
w,N 
AIi models mentioned above try to describe the bargaining situation in a world of 
homogenous labour with only one wage rate. For empirical purpose this wage rate 
14 The three models should not be treated as being too different. MANNING 1987 showed, that all 
three of them may be seen as the special case of a two stage bargaining situation. 
15 See: NICKEL, ANDREWS 1983. 
16 See: OSWALD 1985. 
17 See: McDONALD, SOLOW 1981. 
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could easily be interpreted as average wage. The problem in using one of this models 
for our question is evident: Analysing the effects of minimum wage we have to deal 
with different forms of wages which all are bargaining results. 
For our purpose it is possible to interpret the bargaining result described above only 
as minimum wage and in this paper I will do so: I assume that the reservation wage 
(B) is unemployment benefit and the bargaining result w is the minimum wage.18 All 
other bargains except those about minimum wages are ignored. 
Looking at the three opportunities above, the specific bargaining situation in Austria 
may be described best by a II right to manage model 11 • The reason is that in Austria 
official central bargainings are done only about wages and not about employment. Of 
course, this does not mean, that the union does not care about employment implicitly: 
Remember the utility function of the union, where labour is implemented. 
According to this model, there exists a wage above the competitive one, a labour 
demand according the traditional labour demand function and hence less employment 
than in the full competitive case if the bargaining power of the union is bigger than 
zero. This is a situation very similar to that of implementing legal minimum wages. 
Based on this model, bargained minimum wages should achieve the same negative 
effect on employment like legal minimum wages. 
The crucial point of our empirical analysis done further is the labour demand 
function. I assume: There are many identical entrepreneurs who's production is based 
on technology of constant returns to scale. The production functions allow the 
possibility for different elasticities of substitution between the factors labour and 
capital. This functions are assumed to be of the CES type: 
-1/µ 
1) Yt = Gt [ cxNt-µ + (1-cx)Kt-µ ] 
Yt describes the output, Nt labour, Kt is the capital stock, fixed in the shortrun, and a 
is a weight between the production factors. Gt is a parameter which over time shifts 
18 The specific empirical facts in Austria help for doing so: Regression of minimum wage on average 
wage shows that the coefficient is not significant different from one. 
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the whole production function for instance according to technological change. I' is a 
substitution parameter which allows for different special forms of the production 
function, like that of a Cobb-Douglas, linear or Leontiev type. 1/(1 +µ) = a, where a 
is the elasticity of substitution. 
Firms maximise profits (.n'). They first bargain about the wage (w). For the labour 
demand decision they take this result as given. Good prices (P) arc exogenous, v
1 
describes the capital costs. Then the profit function is: 
-1/µ 
2) -rrt Pt Gt [ aNt-µ + ( 1-a)Kt-µ ] - wtNt - vtKt 
The first order condition has the following form: 
- ( l/µ)-1 
Pt Gt[ aNt-µ + (1-a)Kt-µ] aNt-µ-1 - Wt 
Rearranging of 3), substitution of Y1 (equation one) into the FOC and changing 
1/(l +µ) by a helps to describe the optimal demand for labour (N1 "): 
3.2. Estimated equations 
To achieve the estimation equation in a first step I interpret equation 1) as aggregated 
function. Hence the individual labour demand function 4) may be interpreted as 
aggregated function too. 
In a second step I newly define the factor "labour". To take into consideration the 
development of working time, labour N now is assumed to be the product of the 
number of working people and the average working hours of these people. I assume 
that the average working time of a worker is exogenous for all firms and divide the 
11 
labour demand function 4) by the number of hours. Following this argument leads to 
equation 4 1). Nt* now is the optimal number of working people and ht the average 
working time: 
Third, additionally to the assumption of profit maximisation I assume that there exists 
a gap between the optimal and the actual amount of labour. Reasons may be different 
shocks or adjustment problems. Firms try to adjust the amount of labour over time 
partially. Remember, N* now is the optimal 11 number of working people 11 and N the 
actual one. Let -r be the strength of the partial adjustment, then this adjustment may be 
described in the following form: 
5) for O < T < 1 
Substitution of 4 1) into 5) leads to: 
6) [ Gt-µaa.a Ytfht (wtfPtrar 
Nt-1 
Taking logarithms yields equation 7): 
7) lnNt - lnNt-l [ Ytf ht ] [ Wt ] = T lm:P - -rµa lnGt + T ln -- - -ra In --
Nt-1 Pt • 
or' by reducing to higher terms equation 7,: 
7') 1t.inNt-= Tina.ff - Tµffinc [ >'clhc t + T Jn 
>'c-1/ht-l 1•'c- J 
~,, Jn 
Rearranging 7' leads to an equation which n1a.•· t,c 
, interprctnl helln for ccon"mi, purposes: 
Tina.ff - TµffGt + Hln<Ytfht) + Tln[ __ >'c.J_ 
11t-Jllt.J 
. 
4:11Jn 1 
t .. 
I ! 
Denoting the OLS-coefficients by /Ji and rlna" by "con", tlw following f undion c.ui 
be estimated: 
Hence the growth rate of employment is a function of a constant, a ~rowth p.11.,mrtn. 
the growth rate of hourly output, of lagged logarithmic hourly labour pro<lucti, ity .11111 
of logarithmic real wage. 
For estimation I use a time trend for the growth parameter G, the real output in<,tl'.1d 
of the nominal one and the minimum wage for w. The mathematical rc.1rr.1nf!ing of 
equation 7 to equation 8 implies that in the empirical estimation of equation()) /I~ is 
identical to /h, Hence I made the OLS estimation under this restriction. It is pos,ihk 
to interpret this two coefficients directly. They describe the parameter {or p.1rti.1l 
adjustment -r. 
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J.2. Data set and regression results 
• J . · 9) for data of the aggregated Austrian industry as well as for I est1matc equ.1t1on , , 
-·c· t ·I , The distinction between the branches is due to that of the 
~kdrd spcu 1c nanc 1cs. 
. ,. 1- .1 . l ,. d ," The aggregated values of the specific branches are not Austrian ·ac 1\er Mn c . 
iJcntical with the values for the aggregated industry. The following branches are 
analySC"d: 19 
<01/1 > 
<01/2> 
<03 > 
<0-t> 
<05> 
<0(,> 
<07> 
< 10> 
< 11 > 
< 12> 
< 13> 
<~11111 14-19> 
<20> 
<21 > 
mining 
ironworks 
stones and pottery 
gla.~sworks 
chemistry 
wood-pulp 
paper manufacturing 
wood processing 
food industry 
leather production 
leather manufacturing 
Iron and metal industry 
lexlile industry 
clothing industry 
Source for the minimum wages is the Austrian "BUNDESKAMMER DER 
GEWERBLICHEN WIRTSCHAFf 11 20. Average gross nominal minimum wages are 
puhlished for every above mentioned branch and the industry as a whole. 
All other data, like employment, output, working time and prices are taken from the 
database of the WIF0.21 Output data are the nominal net products. For deflationing I 
used the price indexes of the Austrian industry ("Preisindex des Beitrags der lndustrie 
zum BIP"). I had to use the average working time of the aggregated industry for the 
analysis of the branches too. 
Time hori1..0n and number of observations of the analysis were restricted by the 
availability of the data. Time horizon of the analysis was from 1969 till 1990 for the 
aggregated industry and 1970 till 1990 for the different branches. 
19 ~ L • b 
· um,-c:rs 10 rackets are the order codes of the Austrian "Fachverbande". 
~
0 
m:~DESKA.\tMER DER GEWERBLICHEN WIRTSCHAFr. 
21 WIFO (,\u.~trian Institute for Economic Research). 
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Even though minimum wages are published semiannually, the wage bargaining is 
often done only once a year. Hence the published "semiannual" data in reality often 
are to be interpreted as yearly data. Therefore I had to reduce the analysis to yearly 
observations. 
The estimation results are shown in table 1: 
'.fable I: Ernploymcnl Effccls of Minimum Wages in Auslria 
-------~-
OLS-eslimales or equation 9) under lhc reslriclion lhal 82 = 83. 
Deoendend variable: Growlh rale or employment 
Jearlv dala. 1969 till 1990 (aeereNled industry). 1970 lill 1990 (branches) 
T-values are wrillen below lhe coerricienls. Values ror Durbin- Walson and Q-values for Liune-Box slalislics arc wrillcn in lhe same rows. 
Oulpul: growlh rale or oulout 
Produclivilv: log or Y/(ll 1N} al lime l-1 
MWR: loe or real minimum wage 
Branches conslanl lrend oulpul produclivilv MWR D-W R .. 2 Q(lO 
82 83 84 
Industry. aeeregated 4.01 -0,02 0.63 0,63 -0.16 1.97 0,86 8.57 
8.29 -7.12 8,74 8.74 -6,IO 
Minine 2.14 -0,06 0,21 0,21 -0.13 2.37 0.51 2,76 
2,93 -2,06 3.09 3.09 -2.26 
Ironworks 0,88 -0.01 -0.06 -0.06 -0.10 1.19 0.71 14.40 
1.50 -2.70 1.38 1.38 1.08 
Stones and oollery 4.11 -0.01 0.40 0.40 0.21 1.58 0.68 12.62 
4,63 -1,76 4,92 4,92 -4.15 
Glassworks 4.54 -0.Ql 0.45 0.45 -0.39 1.68 0,73 20.10 
5,85 -2,54 6.12 6,12 -3,54 
Chemistry 2.07 -0.32 0,20 0,20 -0,15 1.64 0,54 10.16 
1.88 -0,67 2,12 2.12 -2,08 
Wood-oulp 0.64 0,00 0,08 0.08 -0.14 1.10 0,27 11.77 
1.24 0.49 1.63 1.63 -1.71 
-VI 
Table one, continuation 
Branches constant trend output produclivit v MWR D-W R0 2 Q(IO 
Paper manuf aclurinl! 1.78 0,00 0,21 0,21 -0.35 1.64 0.34 13,93 
1.10 1.56 1.39 1.39 -2.80 
Wood processing 1.54 0.00 0,16 0.16 -0.19 1.26 0,36 10.81 
l.l2 0.55 1.43 1.43 -2.52 
Food industry 0,76 0,00 0,08 0,08 -0.05 1.74 0.48 7,71 
I.BI -1.58 1.90 1.90 -1.63 
Leather production 2.74 0,00 0,24 0.24 -0,03 1.60 0.38 7.15 
2.36 -0.84 2.60 2.60 -0.10 
Leather manuf acluring 5,78 0,00 0,56 0,56 -0.51 l.84 0,78 7.12 
6.13 - 1.24 5.78 5.78 -2.97 
Iron and metal industry 6,96 -0.10 0,65 0,65 -0.34 1.80 0,75 10.96 
4.70 -3.19 4.88 4.88 -5.63 
Textile industrv 6,01 -0.20 0.54 0.54 -0.18 1.45 0,76 6,76 
6.34 -4.54 6.66 6.66 -2.97 
Clothing induslrv 4,94 0,00 0.54 0,54 -0.26 l.97 0.83 6.82 
6.80 -3.80 7.06 7.06 -6.00 
-c,, 
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Some of the OLS-coefficients above may be interpreted directly. First, the identical 
coefficients 82 and 83 describe the partial adjustment parameter t'. Second, for small 
changes of a variable, the change in the logarithm of this variable is approximately 
the relative change of the variable itself. Hence 84 is the elasticity of the minimum 
wage.22 
The results are univocal. For the aggregated industry all of the estimated coefficients 
are highly significant. Minimum wages have a negative effect on the growth rate of 
employment. On the other side, there is a positive effect of the growth rate of hourly 
output and of logarithmic lagged hourly labour productivity. The partial adjustment 
coefficient (described by 82 and 83) is· 0,63. 84 is -0, 16, hence an increase of real 
wage by one percent decreases the growth rate of employment by 0,16 Percent.23 
Minimum wages are not significant (at a usual five percent level) only in four of the 
14 estimated equations for the different branches (ironworks, wood-pulp, food-
industry and leather production). In two branches, although minimum wages are 
significant, output and productivity are not (paper manufacturing, wood processing). 
All other significant estimations strengthen the result of the aggregated data: 
Minimum wages have a negative impact on employment. The elasticities of minimum 
wage differ from -0, 13 (mining) to -0,51 (leather manufacturing). High elasticities are 
found in glassworks (-0,39), paper manufacturing (-0,35) and iron and metal industry 
(-0,34) too. The elasticities are lower in wood processing (-0,19) and chemistry (-
0,15). The (significant) partial adjustment parameter t' differs between 0,21 (mining) 
and 0,65 (iron and metal industry). 
Hence at first sight, looking at the OLS-estimates, the thesis that minimum wages 
decrease employment seems to be supported. 
3.3. Restrictions of the results 
I have shown that in a partial analytic framework with complete competition and 
partial adjustment of labour, the growth rate of minimum wage is a function of hourly 
22 The estimation results would help to analyse different other variables of the estimated equations too. 
64 may help to estimate the substitution parameter a, since: -ra = 64. The constant may help to 
estimate a. (See: equations 8 and 9). In this paper I am only interested in the effect of minimum wage 
and not in these possibilities. 
23 -0, 16*0,0l = -0,0016 
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output, hourly labour productivity and real minimum wage. Based on a CES 
production function, this is a very general result for this class of models. For the 
empirical results to be true, two important points have to be fulfilled: 
First, our explanatory variables have to be independent. If there exists a positive 
effect of minimum wages on output or productivity, then the explanatory variables are 
not independent. As mentioned in chapter one a positive effect on productivity is 
supposed by the Austrian labour union. 
Second, the causal relationship between the explained and the explanatory variables 
has to work into the "right" direction. If the causal relationship between the attached 
variables works into the "wrong" direction, the results of the OLS-estimation have to 
be relativized. 
Hence, according to the causality between minimum wage and employment, the 
crucial point is that the relation between minimum wage, productivity and output has 
to be examined. If this is not done, the model may be misspecified and therefore the 
OLS results may be wrong. It is important that this fact does not attach only our 
model, but the analysis of other studies about minimum wages too. 
In working paper No. 21 of the Viennese University of Economics and Business 
Administration I discuss the causality between minimum wage, employment, output 
and productivity. 24 
4. Summary 
Most of the studies which try to investigate the effects of minimum wages use a 
standard "neo-classical" partial-analytic framework, which is based on complete 
competitive labour markets.25 Hence minimum wages create a factor market dis-
tortion which in this class of models has to cause negative effects on employment. 
Therefore there exists a big difference between the call for minimum wages of the 
labour unions and the theoretical result of the standard economic theory. 
24 See: RAGACS 1993 
25 For instance see RAGAN 1981. 
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In Austria there exist minimum wages for most of the economic sectors, especially 
manufacturing, and they are the result of a bargaining process between the Austrian 
labour union and the entrepreneurs. 
Contrary to the "standard" theoretical result that minimum wages should decrease 
employment, arguments of the Austrian labour union for the implementation of 
minimum wages exist. One of them states, that minimum wages increase productivity. 
This could lead to output growth and therefore even to an increase of employment. 
In spite of the importance of minimum wages in Austria, no empirical studies about 
their employment effects in the industry are done yet. In this paper I ask for the direct 
effects of minimum wages on employment in the Austrian case. To execute an 
analysis which is comparable to many of them done for other countries I follow the 
traditional partial-theoretical argument and therefore would expect negative effects. 
The empirical analysis is based on the ideas of profit maximisation and partial 
adjustment of employment by the firm. 
The empirical analysis which is done for the aggregated Austrian industry and specific 
branches at first sight seems to support the theoretical thesis: The growth rate of 
employment in most cases is significant negative influenced by the level of 
logarithmic real minimum wage, but positive by output growth and by logarithmic 
lagged productivity in levels. 
At second sight the empirical analysis shows problems, which may occur in similar 
studies done for other countries too: If there exists a positive effect of minimum wage 
on output or productivity, as supposed by the labour union, then the explanatory 
variables are not independent. Additionally there exists the problem that the causal 
relationship between the attached variables may work into the "wrong" direction. 
Hence there exists the possibility that my model and maybe similar one's (the analysis 
done in this paper is based on the very general CES production function) are 
misspecified. 
Further work about the above mentioned problems has to be done. 
20 
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